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NOTES
A PROPOSAL FOR CALCULATING
REIMBURSED VICTIMS OF FINANCIAL
IDENTITY THEFT UNDER THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
INTRODUCTION
On April 18, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit issued an opinion in United States v. Yagar interpreting the
“victims” calculation table of Title 18, Section 2B1.1 of the United States
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Section 2B1.1).1 At issue was whether an
individual bank account holder who was fully reimbursed for financial
losses incurred as a result of financial identity theft should be counted as a
“victim” at sentencing under Section 2B1.1(b)(2).2 This scenario was not
explicitly addressed in Section 2B1.13 when Yagar was decided and the
Sixth Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to address the issue.4 The Yagar
Court held that “victim,” as defined by Application Note 1 of Section
2B1.15 (Application Note 1), did not contemplate a person who was “fully
reimbursed for their temporary financial losses” and “suffered no adverse
effect” as a result of the crime.6 Six months later, in United States v. Lee,
the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Sixth Circuit’s reading of Application
Note 1, and held that individual account holders are counted as “victims”
under Section 2B1.1(b)(2), regardless of whether they have been
reimbursed for their losses.7
Over the next four years, Yagar and Lee were established as seminal
decisions representing the majority and minority viewpoints of an everwidening circuit split.8 Despite the split, and the serious implications of the
interpretation of this section,9 the Supreme Court declined to address the
1. United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 970 (6th Cir. 2005).
2. Id. at 969. For the purposes of this note, “financial identity theft” will refer to any form of
financial fraud covered by Section 2B1.1 that involves the access or use of an individual’s bank
account without his or her knowledge or consent.
3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2004).
4. See Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971.
5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (2004).
6. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971.
7. United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005).
8. See Jacqueline Harrington, Comment, “Once Victim, Always Victim”: Compensated
Individuals Under the Amended Sentencing Guidelines on Fraud, 108 MICH. L. REV. 445, 449–50
nn.22–23 (2009). See also United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2009); United States
v. Orr, 567 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2009);
United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162
(2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Icaza, 492
F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2007).
9. For a discussion of hypothetical scenarios that demonstrate the importance of resolving the
reimbursed issue circuit split, see, e.g., Harrington, supra note 8, at 451–55; Ryan N. Parsons,
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reimbursed victims issue10 and the Federal Sentencing Commission
(Commission) ultimately resolved it pursuant to its statutory authority.11
The Federal Sentencing Commission is required to “review and revise”
provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) periodically
in response to the “observations, comments, or questions” of various federal
agencies.12 In order to address the circuit disagreements over the proper
interpretation of “victim” in Section 2B1.1—and after making a request for
public comment13—the Commission published a proposed amendment to
Application Note 1 on May 8, 2009.14 The proposed amendment provided
that “for purposes of the victims table in subsection [2B1.1](b)(2), an
individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or without
authority is considered a ‘victim’ . . . [but this amendment] cover[s] only
those individuals whose means of identification are actually used.”15
Congress had until November 1, 2009 to reject this proposed amendment,
but declined to do so, rendering it immediately effective.16
The Commission’s amendment is reflected in the Guidelines as
Amendment 726 of Title 18, Appendix C (Amendment 726).17
Significantly, by mandating that reimbursed account holders whose means
of identification were used to perpetuate a fraud be included in the Section
2B1.1(b)(2) “victims” calculation,18 Amendment 726 implicitly adopted
Lee’s minority viewpoint and definitively settled the circuit split.19
Note, Temporary Victims: Interpreting the Federal Fraud and Theft Sentencing Guideline, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 845, 852–53 (2009).
10. See, e.g., Adjei v. U.S., No.07-2295, 2009 WL 405680 (3d Cir. Feb. 19, 2009), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2070 (2009); Wyman v. United States, 427 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1221 (2006).
11. See Notice of the Submission of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United
States Courts, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,750, 21,751 (May 8, 2009).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006).
13. See Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts,
74 Fed. Reg. 4,802, 4,806 (Jan. 27, 2009) (requesting “comment regarding whether § 2B1.1
adequately accounts for a case in which an individual suffers pecuniary harm, but the pecuniary
harm is immediately reimbursed by a third party”); see also United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d
51, 58 n.12 (1st Cir. 2009).
14. See Notice of the Submission of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United
States Courts, 74 Fed. Reg. at 21,751.
15. Id.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C,
Amend. 726 (2010).
17. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C, Amend. 726 (2010).
18. See Harrington, supra note 8, at 448.
19. Every account holder who has been reimbursed for their losses due to financial identity
theft will inherently have had their means of identification used unlawfully or without authority.
See id. Therefore, consistent with Lee, they will always be counted as a “victim” under Section
2B1.1. See id. at 450, 450 n.23; see also Shawn P. Ayotte, Comment, Balancing Proportionality
and Deterrence: The First Circuit’s Definition of “Victims” of Identity Theft in United States v.
Stepanian, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 245, 264 (2010) (noting that the outcomes of Lee and
Amendment 726 “are essentially the same: both treat individual cardholders as ‘victims’ of
identity theft”).
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This note will discuss the opinions issued during the four-year circuit
split and argue that Amendment 726 is an improper resolution of the
reimbursed victims issue for three reasons: (1) it will work contrary to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ stated goal of proportional sentencing by
employing an overbroad presumption that all reimbursed account holders
suffer harm through time lost seeking reimbursement for financial identity
theft;20 (2) it fails to provide a mechanism for calculating time lost seeking
reimbursement as a “pecuniary harm,” which, at sentencing, results in a
calculation of “victims” under Section 2B1.1(2) before a calculation of
“actual loss” under Section 2B1.1(1);21 and (3) it allows for the possibility
of “double-counting” the financial losses suffered by “victims” of financial
identity theft.
Part I of this note will discuss the legislative intent behind the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, their operating structure, and the effect that the
Supreme Court’s decision United States v. Booker22 had on their
application. Part II will provide an overview of various forms of financial
identity theft that can implicate the reimbursed victims issue. Part III will
explain how “actual loss” and the number of “victims” of financial crimes
are tallied under Section 2B1.1(b), and how determining whether to include
reimbursed account holders frustrates these calculations. Part IV will
examine the cases that defined the circuit split and demonstrate how
Amendment 726 falls short of resolving the issues raised. Part V will
propose a solution to the reimbursed victims issue in the form of an
alternative amendment that does not count reimbursed account holders as
“victims”—based on Yagar’s reasoning that reimbursed account holders do
not always suffer an “adverse effect”—but utilizes an upward departure
application to account for the harm that some account holders suffer
through time lost seeking reimbursement for financial identity theft. This
proposed amendment will promote the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ goal
of proportional sentencing as well as remedy the erroneous operation of the
2B1.1(1) “actual loss” calculations and the risk of “double-counting” the
financial losses of “victims” of financial identity theft that exist under
Amendment 726.23
20. See Public Hearing Before the United States Sentencing Commission 37 (2009) (statement
of Jennifer Coffin, National Sentencing Resource Counsel, Federal Public and Community
Defenders), available at http://ftp.ussc.gov/agendas/20090317/transcript.pdf [hereinafter Public
Hearings].
21. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
22. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Booker is a landmark Supreme Court
decision that held that mandatory application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is
unconstitutional. Id. at 250. As discussed in Part I infra, since Booker was decided, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are only considered in an advisory capacity.
23. But cf. Harrington, supra note 8, at 451 (arguing that retribution for financial identity theft
is “best satisfied by treating only compensated individuals as victims”); Parsons, supra note 9, at
864 (arguing that account holders who spent time seeking reimbursement should be counted as
“victims” and their lost time should be included in the “actual loss” calculation).
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I. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES POST-BOOKER
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are a creation of the United States
Sentencing Commission, an independent judicial agency charged with
“establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal
justice system that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed
guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of
federal crimes.”24 Under the Sentencing Reform Act provisions of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, the Commission was granted
broad authority to develop federal sentencing guidelines that would “further
the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just
punishment, and rehabilitation.”25
The Commission submitted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
Congress on April 13, 198726 and they became effective November 1, 1987
after a period of mandatory Congressional review.27 As originally enacted,
the Guidelines contained mandatory sentencing provisions under which a
defendant’s term of imprisonment was calculated through a cross-reference
of 43 “Offense Levels” and 6 “Criminal History Points.” Each Level and
Point is reflected in the X- and Y-axes of the Guidelines’ Sentencing Table,
respectively.28 Thus, the Sentencing Table considers the severity of a crime
in the context of the defendant’s criminal history.29
Parsons advocates for an amendment that adopts the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008). Parsons, supra note 9, at 869. Abiodun
held that a reimbursed account holder is a “victim” under 2B1.1 “if—as a practical matter—they
suffered (1) an adverse effect (2) as a result of the defendant’s conduct that (3) can be measured in
monetary terms.” Abiodun, 536 F.3d at 168−69. Parsons asserts that in articulating the “Abiodun
test,” the Second Circuit “clearly went beyond Yagar’s holding” because Yagar did not speculate
as to what situations would qualify a reimbursed account holder as a “victim,” whereas Abiodun
states that “any time” a reimbursed account holder suffers an “adverse effect measurable in
monetary terms” they are a “victim” under 2B1.1. Parsons, supra note 9, at 863. This contention is
erroneous. In fact, as stated by the Second Circuit, Abiodun is entirely consistent with Yagar. See
Abiodun, 536 F.3d at 168. The Abiodun test was not novel and did not construct a new “test” of
any sort. Rather, it was merely a concise articulation of how “victims” are calculated under
Section 2B1.1(b)(2). Namely, an individual is a “victim” if they suffer “loss” (adverse effect), and
“loss” is defined as “pecuniary harm,” which is harm that is readily measurable in money (can be
measured in monetary terms). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)
(2010); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.2. Moreover, Yagar explicitly found that the
reimbursed account holders at issue in that case had “suffered no adverse effect” because their
“monetary loss was short-lived and immediately covered by a third-party.” United States v. Yagar,
404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, Yagar had no cause to speculate on examples of what
situations would qualify a reimbursed account holder as a “victim.” Further, such speculation
would have been ill-advised—the methods employed to commit financial identity theft, the harms
they cause, and the relative amounts of time required to rectify them, are too numerous and varied
for speculation.
24. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2010).
25. Id. § 1A1.2.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. § 5A Sentencing Table (2010).
29. See id. § 1B1.1.
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The relative assignment of sentence ranges to Levels was developed
using empirical data from numerous relevant sources, including the United
States Parole Commission’s guidelines and statistics, 10,000 presentence
investigations, and the elements of various substantive criminal statutes.30
This methodology is intended to limit the parole board’s power in
determining the actual length of an offender’s prison term, promote a
uniform system where like crimes receive like sentences, and maintain
proportionality between the severity of a crime and the sentence imposed.31
However, deviation from the Sentencing Table is permitted when a court
finds that a recommended sentence range does not adequately reflect the
crime committed. In such instances a court may adjust the recommended
sentence through an upward or downward “departure.”32
Departures are principally permitted when the sentencing court “finds
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described.”33 The Guidelines delineate two forms of
departures: (1) departures pursuant to “specific guidance . . . by analogy or
by other numerical or non-numerical suggestions”; and (2) “unguided”
departures—which include “grounds [for departure] not mentioned in the
guidelines.”34 Significantly, of the two forms of departure, the Commission
“expects that most departures will reflect the suggestions” and unguided
departures are to remain “highly infrequent.”35
While the Guidelines continue to use this methodology—with an eye
towards the same legislative goals—their authority “changed dramatically”
after the 2005 Booker decision.36 In Booker, the Supreme Court held that,
under the Sixth Amendment, only facts admitted to the jury or proved
beyond a reasonable doubt can be considered for sentence calculations, and
therefore the mandatory sentencing provisions of the Guidelines were
unconstitutional.37 As a result, Booker “changed the federal sentencing

30. Id. § 1A1.3.
31. Id. Amendment 726 fails to promote the Guidelines’ goal of proportionality in sentencing
for financial identity theft crimes because it equates the harm suffered by account holders who
were immediately reimbursed for their losses to those who spent great time and effort seeking
reimbursement. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
33. Id. Application Note 19(A)(vi) of Section 2B1.1 provides a non-exhaustive list of factors
for sentencing courts to consider as warranting “Departures” from the Sentencing Table in cases
involving unlawful use of means of identification. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.19(A)(vi) (2010). It does not list time lost seeking reimbursement as a factor
justifying an upward departure. Id.
34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (2010).
35. Id.
36. Andrew Nash, Note, Victims By Definition, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1419, 1434 (2008).
37. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 250–52 (2005).
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guidelines from mandates to advice”38 and judges are no longer bound to
follow them; however, “the Commission believe[s] sentencing courts
should still be giving ‘substantial weight to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in determining the appropriate sentence to impose.’”39
Accordingly, “post-Booker sentencing [is not very] different from preBooker sentencing,” and federal judges routinely abide by the sentencing
structure of the Guidelines.40 Thus, whether mandatory or advisory, the
Guidelines steer the hand of sentencing judges, and the significance of their
construction in securing (or failing to secure) proportional sentencing
remains as critical as it was pre-Booker.
II. FINANCIAL IDENTITY THEFT AND THE EFFECTS OF
REIMBURSEMENT
Financial identity theft crimes can be perpetrated in various ways, but
traditionally “the most common ways to become the victim of identity theft
are through the loss or theft of a purse or wallet, mail theft, and fraudulent
address changes.”41 These methods give perpetrators of financial fraud
crimes access to their victims’ personal information, such as “checkbook[s]
bearing account numbers, Social Security Numbers . . . and business
records.”42
[After] the perpetrator has obtained personal information, that person will
open a bank account in the victim’s name (or access a current account).
The perpetrator will then begin depositing fraudulent, worthless or
counterfeit checks into the account. Most deposits are carried out via
automated teller machines (ATMs). Before checks are cleared, the
perpetrator will withdraw cash on the account via ATMs. . . . In some
instances, the fraudster will deposit empty envelopes, with a dollar amount
annotated, into an ATM.43

More recently, fraudsters have begun perpetrating financial identity
theft by “skimming” account information and PIN numbers—often directly
from electronic payment terminals or ATM machines.44 A common method
employed to skim ATM machines is
38. Douglas A. Berman, Assessing Federal Sentencing After Booker, 17 FED. SENT. R. 291,
291 (2005).
39. Id. (quoting Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 18 (2005) (statement of Honorable Ricardo Hinojosa,
Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Commission)). See also Booker, 543 U.S. at 259; Harrington, supra
note 8, at 446 n.5.
40. Berman, supra note 38, at 292.
41. THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: TRENDS TIPS & ISSUES: ISSUE 2, at 15 (2001), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_02.pdf#page=17.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Automated Theft Machines, TIME, Jan. 17, 2011, at 53, 54.
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using plaster or clay to make a molding of the front of an ATM. Then they
build a plastic facade, ‘sanded down and spray-painted to match the
machine so that it is virtually undetectable,’ . . .
The facade is used to hide a magnetic-card reader, which can be purchased
online. Typically, a video camera is concealed in a light fixture or
brochure holder overlooking the keypad, although occasionally the device
used to capture the PINs is not a camera but a fake key panel overlaid on
the real pad.45

Due to the prevalence of such criminal practices, financial institutions
frequently absorb financial losses from unauthorized transactions.46
Accordingly, for the purposes of calculating “victims” under Section
2B1.1(b)(2), banks and other financial institutions that have reimbursed
their clients for these losses are considered to be individual “persons” at
sentencing.47 Since they bear the ultimate pecuniary loss for such crimes,
counting these financial institutions as “victims” is a logical calculation.
This logic, however, does not transfer as easily when counting reimbursed
individuals as “victims” under Section 2B1.1(b)(2).
III. ARE REIMBURSED ACCOUNT HOLDERS “VICTIMS”?
Section 2B1.1 governs sentencing for financial identity theft and other
financial crimes such as larceny, embezzlement, fraud, and various
counterfeit offenses,48 and “recommends heavier sentences when larger
numbers of victims suffer a pecuniary loss as a result of the offender’s
criminal conduct.”49 This method seems, and is intended, to provide a
consistent and comprehensive blueprint for judges at the time of sentencing.
However, determining who qualifies as a “victim” under Section
2B1.1(b)(2) has complicated this foundational premise.50
Prior to the adoption of Amendment 726, “victim” was defined by
Application Note 1 as “(A) any person who sustained any part of the actual
loss determined under subsection (b)(1); or (B) any individual who
sustained bodily injury as a result of the offense.”51 Under Section
2B1.1(b)(2), a defendant’s recommended sentence is increased relative to
the number of “victims” affected by her crime. A two-Level increase is
45. Id. (quoting Kim DeLeo, FBI Supervisory Special Agent).
46. One study estimated the cost of such losses to be $11 billion in 2009. See LEXISNEXIS,
2009 LEXISNEXIS TRUE COST OF FRAUD STUDY 6, 19 (2009), http://www.riskfinance.com/
RFL/Merchant_Card_Fraud_files/LexisNexisTotalCostFraud_09.pdf.
47. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (2010) (“‘Person’ includes
individuals, corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies.”).
48. Id. § 2B1.1.
49. Nash, supra note 36, at 1436 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2B1.1(b)(2) (2007)).
50. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 8, at 447–48.
51. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (2010).
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triggered by a crime involving 10 or more victims;52 a four-Level increase
is triggered by a crime involving 50 or more victims;53 and a six-Level
increase is triggered by a crime involving 250 or more victims.54 “This
sliding scale of enhanced punitive liability is one of the ‘key compromises’
of the Guidelines, under which an offender’s recommended sentence
increases with the magnitude of the crime but not in direct proportion to
it.”55
A defendant’s recommended sentence is also enhanced relative to the
amount of “actual loss” incurred by the “victims” of her crime.56 Section
2B1.1(b)(1) defines sixteen categories of summed “actual loss” and
recommends relative sentence enhancements57 ranging from no
recommended increase in sentencing for “actual loss” of $5,000 or less58 to
a thirty-Level increase for “actual loss” totaling more than $400,000,000.59
The definition of “actual loss” was not altered by Amendment 726 and is
defined as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from
the offense.”60 “‘Pecuniary harm’ means harm that is monetary or that
otherwise is readily measurable in money.”61 “‘[R]easonably foreseeable
pecuniary harm’ means pecuniary harm that the defendant knew or, under
the circumstances, reasonably should have known, was a potential result of
the offense.”62 In sum, under Section 2B1.1, “a person is the victim of a
crime if he or she suffers ‘actual loss,’ which is in turn defined as
‘pecuniary [harm].’”63
Identifying “victims” under Section 2B1.1(2) and the “actual loss”
ascribed to them under Section 2B1.1(1) is problematic in the case of
reimbursed account holders because an injury sustained as a result of
financial identity theft is often wholly alleviated when they are reimbursed
by a bank or other financial institution. Often banks are able to detect such
offenses and reimburse account holders before they are even aware of their
losses.64 In these instances, it may be argued that because the account
holder does not suffer a quantifiable harm, he should not be included in the

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i).
Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B).
Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C).
Nash, supra note 36, at 1436 (citation omitted).
Critical to this calculation is that the “actual loss” be incurred by a “victim” of the crime.
See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing how Amendment 726 violates this constructional mandate).
57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2010).
58. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(A).
59. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P).
60. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i).
61. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii).
62. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iv).
63. Nash, supra note 36, at 1439. This note argues that time lost seeking reimbursement is not
readily measurable in dollar amount, therefore it is not a “pecuniary harm,” and should not be
reflected in the 2B1.1B(b)(1) “actual loss” calculations.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 2009).
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“victims” calculation.65 However, in other instances, the dollar amount
stolen and subsequently reimbursed is not representative of the crime’s
injurious effects because financial identity theft imparts not only monetarily
quantitative, but qualitative harm as well.66 Victims of identity theft may
endure intense emotional impacts of victimization such as rage, betrayal,
powerlessness, frustration, or even fear for their physical safety.67
While the Federal Sentencing Commission affirmatively excluded
consideration of emotional impact as a pecuniary harm under Section
2B1.1,68 noticeably absent from Application Note 1, or any of the
application notes supplementing Section 2B1.1 prior to Amendment 726’s
implementation,69 was whether fully reimbursed account holders have
suffered an “actual loss” and should therefore be included in the “victims”
calculation.70 Without this elucidation, federal judges were left without
proper guidance as to what constitutes pecuniary harm for a financial
identity theft offense and whether a reimbursed account holder should be
counted as a “victim” under 2B1.1(b)(2).71 This led to differing
interpretations of “victimhood” among judges and “inconsistent
adjudications of similar fact patterns.”72 As a result, criminal defendants
charged with financial identity theft under Section 2B1.1 could receive
significantly different sentences depending upon the circuit in which they
were charged, an outcome in direct conflict with the Guidelines’ goals of
uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.73
The Commission sought a remedy to this shortcoming during a Public
Hearing on Proposed Amendments held in 2009.74 Eric Handy, a
65. See, e.g., Parsons, supra note 9 (suggesting that reimbursed account holders who suffer no
adverse affect should not be included in the “victims” calculation).
An argument can be made that once an account holder’s financial information has been
unlawfully disseminated, due to the insidious nature of financial identity theft crimes, they are at
risk of suffering a future harm that will not be taken into account at sentencing and they should
therefore be included in the “victims” calculation. However, the inclusion of a victim who has not
yet suffered any harm in a sentencing calculation is both contrary to the Guidelines’ goals of
proportional sentencing and is a constructional error under Section 2B1.1. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
66. See IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, IDENTITY THEFT: THE AFTERMATH 2008, at 18
(2008), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/Aftermath_2008_20090520.pdf.
67. See id. at 32–33 tbl.22. This is often directly related to the many months or years they
spend repairing the harm they have suffered as a result of financial identity theft. See id. at 19
tbl.10; see also Public Hearings, supra note 20, at 90 (statement of Eric Handy, Mid Atlantic
Coast Representative, Identity Theft Resource Center).
68. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii) (2010) (“‘Pecuniary
harm’ means harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily measureable in money.
Accordingly, pecuniary harm does not include emotional distress, harm to reputation or other noneconomic harm.”).
69. See id. § 2B1.1 cmt. nn.1–4.
70. Harrington, supra note 8, at 451.
71. Nash, supra note 36, at 1439.
72. Id. at 1438.
73. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
74. See Public Hearings, supra note 20, at 12–13 (statement of Michael Dubose, Chief, Comp.
Crime & Intel. Prop. Sec., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice).

456

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 5

representative for the Identity Theft Resource Center, advocated for the
categorical inclusion of reimbursed account holders in the “victims”
calculation75 and testified to the hardships endured by people attempting to
restore their identities once their accounts have been compromised by
financial identity theft.76 Jennifer Coffin, staff attorney for the National
Sentencing Resource Council of the Federal Public and Community
Defenders, argued in favor of implementing a departure application—as
opposed to a Guidelines amendment—to address the reimbursed victims
issue.77 The Commission found Handy’s testimony persuasive and, in May
2009, submitted a proposed amendment (ultimately Amendment 726) to
Section 2B1.1 embracing his argument.
Amendment 726 is intended to account for the lost time that reimbursed
account holders suffer attempting to repair the damage done to their
identities,78 and to cure future inconsistencies in “victims” calculations
among the federal circuits.79 It provides that:
The Commentary to § 2B1.1 captioned “Application Notes” is amended in
Note 4 by adding at the end the following:
“(E) Cases Involving Means of Identification.—For purposes of
subsection (b)(2), in a case involving means of identification
‘victim’ means (i) any victim as defined in Application Note 1; or
(ii) any individual whose means of identification was used
unlawfully or without authority.”80

In conjunction with these changes, Amendment 726 “move[d] the
definition[] of ‘means of identification’ . . . to Application Note 1”81 so it is
now in close proximity to the definition of “victim.”82 “‘Means of
identification’ has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7),
except that such means of identification shall be of an actual (i.e., not
fictitious) individual . . . .”83 Title 18 Section 1028(d)(7)(D) includes
“access device (as defined in section 1029(e))” as a definition of “means of
identification.”84

75. See id. at 26 (statement of Eric Handy, Mid Atlantic Coast Representative, Identity Theft
Resource Center).
76. Id. at 23–26.
77. Id. at 65 (statement of Jennifer Coffin, National Sentencing Resource Counsel, Federal
Public & Community Defenders).
78. See id. at 88–90 (statement of Eric Handy, Mid Atlantic Coast Representative, Identity
Theft Resource Center) (testifying to studies conducted by the Identity Theft Resource Center that
demonstrate that account holders often spend great amounts of time repairing their identities).
79. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C, Amend. 726, at 309–10 (2010).
80. Id. at 307.
81. Id. at 310.
82. See id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (2010).
83. Id.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7) (2006). “Access device” is defined as:
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The Commission’s effort to remedy the reimbursed victims issue
through Amendment 726 effectively cured future inconsistencies in
“victims” calculations, but 2B1.1 still suffers from an inherent lack of
proportionality in sentencing.85 Instead of having their “victims” calculation
depend upon the federal circuit in which they are brought to trial,
defendants now face the possibility of disproportionate sentencing due to an
overbroad presumption that the account holders affected by their crime
spent significant amounts of time seeking reimbursement for their financial
losses.86 This approach creates inequitable disparities, as revealed by the
issues that arose during the four year circuit split.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines had not contemplated the
reimbursed victims issue, the omission of consideration of reimbursed
account holders in Section 2B1.1 and the shifting curative ability of
reimbursement proved to frustrate the sentencing calculations of judges
who were attempting to determine what qualifies for “victimhood” under
Section 2B1.1.87 Prior to the ratification of Amendment 726 in November
2009, at least nine federal Courts of Appeal had issued opinions on the
proper interpretation of Application Note 1 and the reimbursed victims
issue.88 Although Yagar and Lee established what were to become the
majority and minority viewpoints of the debate,89 the depth of the inquiry
expanded in subsequent opinions and no clear standard evolved among the
circuits prior to the adoption of Amendment 726 for defining who is a
“victim” of financial identity theft. While the reasoning among the circuits
was divergent and appeared to suggest disproportional sentencing for
financial identity theft crimes, in reality, judges were reaching decisions
that resulted in proportional sentencing.90
any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, mobile identification
number, personal identification number, or other telecommunications service,
equipment, or instrument identifier, or other means of account access that can be used,
alone or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods, services, or
any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds (other than a
transfer originated solely by paper instrument).
18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1) (2006).
85. See Parsons, supra note 9, at 864.
86. See Public Hearings, supra note 20, at 37 (statement of Jennifer Coffin, National
Sentencing Resource Counsel, Federal Public and Community Defenders) (stating that, “by
adopting [Amendment 726], the Commission would create a wholesale presumption [that
reimbursed account holders spend significant amounts of time seeking reimbursement]”).
87. See Nash, supra note 36, at 1441.
88. See cases cited supra note 8.
89. See Harrington, supra note 8, at 449–50.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009) (account holders were
counted as “victims” and there was evidence that many had been significantly inconvenienced due
to temporary loss of funds); United States v. Orr, 567 F.3d 610, 615 (10th Cir. 2009) (account
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Generally, each Court of Appeals addressing the issue considered
whether or not the individual account holders had spent significant time or
effort seeking reimbursement and ultimately reached a sentencing decision
that proportionally reflected the harm they had suffered.91 Notably, in
United States v. Kennedy, the Third Circuit proclaimed that it did not
believe a circuit split even existed on the reimbursed victims issue.92 While
this assertion was erroneous,93 it is telling of the reality that the federal
circuits were assigning “victims” Level enhancements that were in
proportion to the harm suffered by reimbursed account holders, despite
inconsistencies in their reasoning.94 Such an equitable outcome is now
precluded by the overbroad presumption mandated by Amendment 726,95
but would remain possible with an amendment that adopts Yagar’s
reasoning coupled with an upward departure application that contemplates
time lost seeking reimbursement in lieu of counting reimbursed account
holders as “victims.”
In Yagar, the Sixth Circuit held that reimbursed account holders whose
losses were short-lived were not to be counted as “victims” under
2B1.1(b)(2), but included a “qualifying explanation,”96 which contemplated
that a “victims” calculation was ultimately a fact sensitive determination
dependent upon whether or not the individual account holders had actually
suffered any “adverse effect.”97
holders were not counted as “victims” and the government had failed to prove they had sustained
any loss); United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 2009) (account holders were not
counted as “victims” and the government had failed to prove that they even knew their funds had
been stolen before they were completely reimbursed); United States v. Pham, 545 F.3d 712, 719
(9th Cir. 2008) (account holders were not counted as “victims” and the government did not prove
that their losses were not “short-lived”); United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir.
2008) (account holders were counted as “victims” and it had been shown that they spent an
“appreciable amount of time securing reimbursement”); United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480,
491 (5th Cir. 2008) (account holders were not counted as “victims” and they had been quickly
reimbursed for the improper charges on their accounts); United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 811, 895
(11th Cir. 2005) (account holders were counted as “victims” and they had “suffered considerably
more than a small out-of-pocket loss and were not immediately reimbursed by any third party”);
United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005) (account holders were not counted as
“victims” and their monetary loss was short-lived and immediately covered by a third party).
91. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
92. Kennedy, 554 F.3d at 421.
93. The Third Circuit’s commentary in Kennedy on the reimbursed victims issue reveals that it
failed to address the fundamental distinction of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Lee: reading the
Credits Against Loss provision to be an inherent acknowledgement of an initial loss to the
individual account holder. See Lee, 427 F.3d at 895. The Third Circuit equated the Eleventh
Circuit’s recognition of distinguishing facts between Yagar and Lee to be tantamount to an
acceptance of Yagar’s analysis, when, in fact, the Eleventh Circuit unequivocally opposed Yagar
on this issue. See Parsons, supra note 9, at 856 n.96.
94. See Parsons, supra note 9, at 854–55.
95. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
96. United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 2008).
97. See United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005). In contrast, the First and
Eleventh Circuits read the Credits Against Loss provision to contain an implicit recognition that
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The effect Amendment 726 would have on the reasoning employed by
the Circuits in cases that addressed the reimbursed victims issue will be
discussed next. This should reveal the inadequacies of Amendment 726 for
promoting sentencing proportionality, and the intrinsic errors mandated by
its construction. Amendment 726 will not promote sentencing
proportionality because time lost seeking reimbursement will be equated for
every account holder whose means of identification was used as a result of
financial identity theft, regardless of whether they actually lost any.
Amendment 726’s constructional errors arise because it counts the
“victims” of a financial identity theft crime under Section 2B1.1(b)(2)
before conducting an “actual loss” calculation under Section 2B1.1(b)(1),
and because it allows for the possibility of double-counting financial losses.
A. THE STARTING POINT: YAGAR & LEE
The circuit split on the reimbursed victims issue first arose in the 2005
Yagar and Lee opinions.98 Yagar, the first circuit court opinion to address
the reimbursed victims issue99—and the resultant majority viewpoint100—
held that reimbursed account holders are not necessarily always “victims”
under the definition of Section 2B1.1(b)(2);101 conversely, Lee,102—which
became the minority position103—declined to adopt Yagar’s reasoning and
held that reimbursed account holders are categorically “victims.”104 At its
core, this dispute effectively concerned the question of when a court should
calculate the number of “victims” for a crime under Section 2B1.1.105 The
Yagar court calculated the number of “victims” based on their relative
position at the time of trial,106 whereas the Lee court calculated the number
of “victims” at the instant the crime was committed.107 This is a simplified,
yet critical, distinction. A court calculating “victims” based on their relative
position at trial is able to consider the curative effects of reimbursement,
whereas a court calculating “victims” at the moment a financial identity

reimbursed account holders are always “victims.” See Lee, 427 F.3d at 895; United States v.
Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009).
98. See supra Introduction.
99. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971.
100. See Harrington, supra note 8, at 449, 449 n.22.
101. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971.
102. Lee, 427 F.3d at 894.
103. See Harrington, supra note 8, at 450 n.23.
104. Lee, 427 F.3d at 895.
105. Compare Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971 (holding that account holders are not considered
“victims” when their monetary loss is short-lived and immediately covered by a third party, rather
than defining them as “victims” the moment the crime is committed), with Lee, 427 F.3d at 895
(holding that the Credits Against Loss provision of Section 2B1.1 inherently recognizes that
reimbursed account holders are “victims” because they have suffered a loss at the moment the
crime is committed). See also Nash, supra note 36, at 1441.
106. See Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971.
107. See Lee, 427 F.3d at 895.
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theft crime is perpetrated will automatically include each account holder in
the “victims” calculation, regardless of whether they have spent any
significant time or effort seeking reimbursement.108
In Yagar, the defendant had been convicted of a bank fraud scheme in
which she used stolen checks from thirteen different bank accounts and
stolen information from over fifty individuals’ bank accounts to steal
almost $90,000.109 At sentencing in district court, the defendant received a
two-Level enhancement under Section 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) for a crime involving
more than ten “victims.”110 On appeal, both the United States and the
defendant argued that this was an improper calculation of the number of
“victims” involved in the crime. The government’s position was that a fourLevel enhancement was appropriate under Section 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) (fifty or
more “victims”) because even though they were later reimbursed, more than
sixty different individuals temporarily lost money as a result of the
defendant’s conduct.111 Conversely, Yagar argued that the five banks who
reimbursed the account holders were the only entities that suffered “actual
loss” and, therefore, none of the reimbursed account holders should be
counted as “victims.”112 The Sixth Circuit found for the defendant on the
reimbursed victims issue, holding that the individual account holders
affected were not to be counted as “victims” at sentencing, and rejected the
government’s position that “‘[t]here is no limitation as to when the actual
loss must exist’” under the Guidelines.113 The Yagar court reasoned that the
account holders had not suffered any “adverse effect” because their losses
were “short-lived and immediately covered by a third-party.” Therefore,
they had not suffered any “actual loss” or “pecuniary harm,” and thus were
not “victims.”114 Yet, the Yagar court recognized that there could be
situations in which reimbursed account holders do suffer an “adverse
effect,” and the qualifying explanation reflects this.
Although the account holders at issue in Yagar were not found to be
“victims,” the Yagar qualifying explanation stated that “there may be
situations in which a person could be considered a ‘victim’ under the
Guidelines even though he or she is ultimately reimbursed.”115 The Yagar
line of reasoning thus left open the possibility for another court to find
reimbursed account holders to be “victims” under 2B1.1(b)(2) without
conflicting with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis. It is this distinction that
allowed Yagar’s reasoning to ensure uniform sentencing proportionality
108. See id.
109. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 968.
110. Id. at 967 (counting as “victims” the five banks and six account holders who had to
purchase new checks because of defendant’s scheme).
111. Id. at 970.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 971.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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that would not be possible under Lee, and is not now possible under
Amendment 726. Neither Lee nor Amendment 726 allow a sentencing
judge to consider whether a reimbursed account holder has suffered any
adverse effect as a result of the time they lose seeking reimbursement.
In Lee, defendants Lee and Wyman were prosecuted for cashing “more
than one million dollars’ worth of personal checks drawn upon closed bank
accounts” in a private offset exchanges scheme116 that attempted to draw
upon money held by the United States Treasury.117 The Lee court held that
the account holders at issue had suffered harm seeking reimbursement for
their losses, and factually distinguished the account holders from those in
Yagar, because the account holders in Lee had spent considerable time
pursuing legal remedies for their losses and there were no third parties
readily available to reimburse them.118 The Lee court also took direct issue
with Yagar’s reading of Section 2B1.1, holding that it was erroneous not to
read the “Actual Loss” provision of Application Note 3(A)(i)119 with the
“Credits Against Loss” provision of Application Note 3(E)(i).120 Under
Lee’s reading of these provisions, reimbursed account holders are always
counted as “victims” due to the “initial loss” they suffer when their
identities are stolen.121
The Credits Against Loss provision states that “loss” should “be
reduced” by “[t]he money returned, and the fair market value of the
property returned and the services rendered, by the defendant or other
persons acting jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the offense
was detected.”122 The Lee court reasoned that the inclusion of the word
“victim” in the Credits Against Loss provision was an “inherent . . .
acknowledgement that there was in fact an initial loss, even though it was
subsequently remedied by recovery of collateral or return of goods.”123
116. Private offset exchange schemes arise out of a
commercially unrecognized system rooted in the notion that the United States Treasury
amasses moneys rightfully belonging to individuals. Private offset exchanges were
claimed mechanisms for individuals to access this Treasury-held money. Using closed
checking accounts, an individual would write a check to obtain a good or service. As
these checks were written on closed accounts, the account on which the check was
drawn could not provide the funds to pay for the goods. Instead, these offset checks
were theoretically to be presented to the Treasury by the drawee bank or payee for
reimbursement with the stockpiled funds.
United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 884 (11th Cir. 2005).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 895.
119. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i) (2010).
120. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(i).
121. Lee, 427 F.3d at 895.
122. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(i) (2010) (emphasis added).
123. Lee, 427 F.3d at 895. See also United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56–57 (1st Cir.
2009) (citing United States v. Cornelius, Nos. 06-10727 & 06-10763, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
26975, at *4 (11th Cir. Oct. 30, 2006)).
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Lee’s reasoning thus nullified the effect that reimbursement can have upon
the “victims” calculation, and automatically counted each account holder
who had been affected by the crime. Thus, for the purposes of promoting
sentencing proportionality, Yagar’s reasoning is superior to that of Lee
because the Yagar qualifying explanation allowed a sentencing court to
consider whether or not an account holder had suffered a pecuniary harm
seeking reimbursement,124 whereas the Lee court’s reasoning allowed for no
such inquiry and categorically defined reimbursed account holders as
“victims.”125
Had the Yagar court been confronted with the facts of Lee, it likely
would have included the reimbursed account holders in the “victims”
calculation, despite applying a different interpretation of Section
2B1.1(b)(2). As noted by the Lee court, “the monetary losses suffered by
these parties were neither short-lived nor immediately covered by third
parties” and “unlike the individual account holders in Yagar, [Lee’s]
victims suffered considerably more than a small out-of-pocket loss and
were not immediately reimbursed by any third party.”126 Thus, this would
logically place Lee’s “victims” within the circumstances alluded to in the
Yagar qualifying explanation where “a person could be considered a
‘victim’ under the Guidelines even though he or she is ultimately
reimbursed.”127 However, the reverse is not true. Based on Lee, had the
Eleventh Circuit been presented with the facts of Yagar, it would have
reached an opposite conclusion on the reimbursed victims issue than did the
Sixth Circuit. The Lee court’s reading of the Credits Against Loss provision
categorically defines reimbursed account holders as “victims” under
2B1.1(b)(2), irrespective of whether or not their losses were short-lived or
did not cause any “pecuniary harm.”128 Thus, the 2B1.1(b)(2) “victims”
calculation under Lee was prone to disproportionate outcomes because it
could not take into account whether an account holder had actually suffered
any “pecuniary harm” despite being reimbursed. By adopting Lee’s
minority viewpoint in Amendment 726,129 so too has the Federal Sentencing
Commission perpetuated outcomes that are in conflict with the Guidelines’
goal of promoting sentencing proportionality. This is further demonstrated
by the circuit opinions that followed Yagar and Lee.
124. United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005). See also United States v.
Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 2008).
125. See Lee, 427 F.3d at 895.
126. Id.
127. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971.
128. See Lee, 427 F.3d at 895.
129. Amendment 726 makes no mention of the proper reading of the Credits Against Loss
provision, but the practical effect of the Amendment is identical because an account holder will be
counted as a victim under 2B1.1(b)(2) regardless of whether or not they have suffered any
pecuniary harm. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C, Amend. 726 (2010).
See also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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B. YAGAR AND LEE APPLIED
Circuit opinions on the reimbursed victims issue generally adopted
either the position of Yagar or Lee.130 The majority of these opinions were
consistent with Yagar, whether or not they held that the reimbursed account
holders at issue were “victims.”131 The Yagar line of opinions held that
account holders who were quickly reimbursed and did not suffer any
“pecuniary harm” or “actual loss” were not “victims,” but employed
reasoning that would count as “victims” those account holders who were
not quickly reimbursed and suffered “pecuniary harm” as a result.132 In
contrast, the Lee line of opinions held that reimbursed account holders are
always “victims,” notwithstanding the effects of any reimbursement.133
As previously discussed, Amendment 726 has implicitly adopted Lee’s
reasoning. The folly of this is three-fold: (1) Lee’s reasoning allows for the
possibility of disproportionate sentencing by equivocating the harm
suffered by account holders who lost time seeking reimbursement to those
who did not; (2) Lee’s reasoning includes account holders in the “victims”
calculation based on the harm they suffer seeking reimbursement without
providing a mechanism for including this harm in the “actual loss”
calculation; and (3) Lee’s reasoning allows for the possibility of doublecounting financial losses caused by financial identity theft.
1. Proportional Sentencing
Of the courts that found that the reimbursed account holders at issue
were not “victims,” most reasoned that they did not suffer any “actual loss”
or “pecuniary harm” when their monetary loss was “short-lived and
immediately covered by a third party.” This argument, first articulated in
Yagar,134 was embraced by the Fifth,135 Ninth,136and Tenth137 Circuits. As
demonstrated by the account holders at issue in these opinions, victims of
financial identity theft do not necessarily spend any significant amount of
time seeking reimbursement for their losses.138
130. See Nash, supra note 36, at 1439–41. But see Parsons, supra note 9, at 853 (asserting that
there were three distinct lines of opinions within the reimbursed victims issue circuit split).
131. See Harrington, supra note 8, at 449.
132. See supra Part IV.B.1.
133. See supra Part IV.B.1.
134. United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005).
135. See United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 491 (5th Cir. 2008).
Here, the account holders were reimbursed by third parties (as in Yagar), and the
Government does not point to evidence that any account holder had to spend money or
an extended length of time seeking reimbursement. We do not have to reach the issue of
whether the parties counted as “victims” under our rule.
Id.

136. United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 782 (9th Cir. 2008).
137. United States v. Orr, 567 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2009).
138. Amendment 726 therefore creates an erroneous presumption in light of these cases.

464

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 5

The Fifth Circuit followed Yagar’s reasoning in United States v.
Conner.139 In that case, defendant Whately had purchased goods at Home
Depot stores and charged them to the accounts of multiple companies
without authorization.140 In the district court, Whately’s base offense was
increased four Levels under Section 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) because he had
unlawfully charged his purchases to the accounts of between 50 and 250
different companies.141 On appeal, the Conner Court cited Yagar142 and
reversed the 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement143 because the affected account
holders had been fully and quickly reimbursed for the unauthorized charges
on their accounts,144 and thus had not suffered any “pecuniary harm.”145 In
reaching this decision, the Conner Court stressed that “pecuniary harm” is
harm that resulted from the offense and stated that it did not see any reason
why the court should “‘stop the clock’ immediately after the credit accounts
were used, as opposed to measuring pecuniary harm following the events
that actually took place, including the crediting of the accounts by the
issuers of credit.”146
In United States v. Pham, the Ninth Circuit joined the Fifth in adopting
Yagar’s reasoning and remanded a case involving a scheme where the
defendant had “created fraudulent driver’s licenses and other identifying
documents and orchestrated counterfeit check cashing activities, the
proceeds of which were then deposited in his bank account or the account
of another scheme leader’s girlfriend.”147 The Pham court held that the
individual account holders were not “victims” and stated that “[i]f the
account holders victimized by Pham were fully reimbursed as soon as they
notified their banks of the fraudulent activity, then they cannot reasonably
be said to have suffered or ‘sustained’ the losses that were only temporarily
and fleetingly reflected in their accounts.”148 The Pham Court also
distinguished its account holders from those in Lee, because in Lee the
account holders were not reimbursed by their banks and recovered their
losses “from the defendants themselves.”149
The Third Circuit’s first opinion on the reimbursed victims issue was
decided in United States v. Kennedy in early 2009.150 Defendant Kennedy
was a “representative payee liaison” of a non-profit corporation that assisted
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See Conner, 537 F.3d at 491.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 492.
The Conner court declined to address whether these account holders would have properly
been counted as “victims” if they had spent time and effort seeking reimbursement. Id. at 491.
145. Id. at 489, 491.
146. Id. at 490.
147. United States v. Pham, 545 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2008).
148. Id. at 719.
149. Id. at 720.
150. See United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2009).
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elderly people in managing their finances.151 She utilized her access to her
client’s financial accounts to write fraudulent checks and steal over $50,000
from thirty-four individual account holders152—all of whom were
reimbursed before they were aware that their funds had even been stolen.153
The Kennedy court, adopting Yagar’s reasoning, held that because the
affected account holders were reimbursed by Kennedy’s employer and its
insurer, they had not sustained any part of the “actual loss” and thus were
not “victims” as defined by Section 2B1.1(b)(2).154
The Tenth Circuit addressed the reimbursed victims issue in May 2009
and sided with Yagar and its progeny in United States v. Orr.155 Defendant
Orr had compromised the credit card numbers of over seven hundred
individual accounts by “‘min[ing]’ credit card data ‘through the use of
skimming devices,’ ‘download[ing]’ the credit card data ‘into a computer to
create fraudulent credit cards,’ and then us[ing] the fraudulent credit cards
‘at retail stores to purchase high end items.’”156 When it addressed the
reimbursed victims issue, the Orr court found that the government had
failed to carry its evidentiary burden of proving that the account holders
affected by Orr’s scheme had not been fully reimbursed, and it was thus
error to include them in the “victims” calculation at sentencing.157
In contrast to Yagar, Pham, Conner, and Orr—where the account
holders at issue did not expend significant time or energy seeking
reimbursement for their losses—the Third,158 Second,159 and First160 Circuit
Courts of Appeal addressed the reimbursed victims issue while presented
with account holders who had not been immediately reimbursed for their
losses and suffered an adverse effect as a result. As in Lee, the Courts of
Appeals in each case held that time lost seeking reimbursement was a
“reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm” and therefore those account
holders were to be included in the “victims” calculation. Thus, inclusion of
these “victims” at sentencing was in proportion to the harm caused by the
crime. However, as demonstrated below, in contrast to the First Circuit,161
the Third and Second Circuits reached conclusions that are compatible with
the Yagar decision because they did not hold that all reimbursed account
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 417.
Id. at 417–18.
Id. at 419.
Id.
United States v. Orr, 567 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 612.
Id. at 615. The Orr court also stated that an individual credit card holder who is “fully and
timely reimbursed” has not suffered any “actual loss.” Id. at 616. This holding demonstrates the
constructional error of both the Lee line of reasoning and, subsequently, Amendment 726. See
discussion Part IV.B.2 infra.
158. See United States v. Adjei, No. 07-2295, 2009 WL 405680, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 19, 2009).
159. See United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 2008).
160. See United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 811, 895 (11th Cir. 2005).
161. See United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009).
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holders are counted as “victims.” Instead, the courts ruled only that the
account holders at issue in each case had suffered harm despite being
reimbursed; therefore, they could each fall within the circumstances
suggested by the Yagar qualifying explanation.
In United States v. Abiodun, defendant Abiodun had purchased roughly
four to five hundred stolen credit reports downloaded from the internet by a
third party, and committed credit card and access device fraud using stolen
credit card information obtained from the reports.162 The Second Circuit
held that the individual account holders affected by the crime were properly
considered “victims” because there was evidence that they had to spend “an
appreciable amount of time securing reimbursement for their financial
losses from their banks or credit card companies”163—but it did not hold
that the Credits Against Loss provision mandated such a result.
In United States v. Adjei, the Third Circuit was faced with a defendant
who had been convicted of “fil[ing] 175 false tax returns with the Internal
Revenue Service . . . using stolen information from hospital patients,”164
and, as a result of his conduct, “individual hospital patients had to engage in
a long, drawn-out process to regain their identities and obtain proper tax
returns.”165 The Third Circuit held that the individuals the defendant
defrauded who “spent time or money seeking reimbursement” could qualify
as “victims” as defined by Section 2B1.1(b)(2)—but, as in Abiodun, it did
not hold that the Credits Against Loss provision mandated such a result.166
Neither Adjei nor Abiodun held that reimbursed account holders
categorically were, or were not, to be counted as “victims,” only that the
account holders in these cases were to be counted as “victims” because they
had suffered harm seeking reimbursement.167 Thus, both Adjei and Abiodun
are not inconsistent with the Yagar qualifying explanation, despite counting
reimbursed account holders as “victims” under 2B1.1(b)(2). However, in
the 2009 opinion United States v. Stepanian, the First Circuit directly
rejected Yagar’s reasoning in favor of Lee’s.168
Defendant Stepanian had been convicted in a scheme whereby he and
three co-conspirators secretly replaced payment terminals in Stop & Shop
grocery stores with “altered terminals [that] were equipped with devices
that recorded, or ‘skimmed,’ debit card numbers, PIN codes, and credit card
numbers whenever customers swiped their cards to make purchases.”169 In
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Abiodun, 536 F.3d at 163.
Id. at 166.
United States v. Adjei, No. 07-2295, 2009 WL 405680, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 19, 2009).
Id at *2.
Adjei, 2009 WL 405680, at *3. This decision supplemented the decision in Kennedy,
where the court previously declined to rule on the reimbursed victims issue. See United States v.
Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 442 (3d Cir. 2009).
167. See Adjei, 2009 WL 405680, at *2–4; Abiodun, 536 F.3d at 167–69.
168. United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009).
169. Id. at 53; see also United States v. Ter-Esayan, 570 F.3d 46, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2009).
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ruling that the account holders affected by his scheme were “victims,” the
court placed great weight on the “declaration of victim losses”170 statements
that had been filed in district court to conclude that they had suffered real
economic loss during the period in which they were unable to access their
funds,171 and held that such losses were within the “reasonably foreseeable
pecuniary harm” intended by Section 2B1.1(b)(2).172 Significantly,
Stepanian was the only circuit court decision in four years to directly reject
Yagar in favor of Lee, holding that reimbursed account holders are
necessarily counted as “victims” because the Credits Against Loss
provision contemplates the existence of an initial loss despite any
subsequent reimbursement.173 In Stepanian, counting the affected account
holders as “victims” proportionately reflected the harm caused by the
defendant’s conduct. However, in adopting Lee’s reasoning (which is now
reflected by Amendment 726), Stepanian foreclosed the future possibility
of excluding account holders that had not suffered harm through time lost
seeking reimbursement from the “victims” calculation.
Yagar, Conner, Orr, Pham, and Kennedy demonstrate the folly of such
reasoning. In each of these cases the account holders at issue were found to
have been rapidly reimbursed for their losses and thus had not suffered any
“pecuniary harm” or “actual loss.”174 Despite this, Amendment 726 would
now presuppose that these account holders had suffered harm seeking
reimbursement and mandate that they be included in the 2B1.1(b)(2)
“victims” calculation. While the Conner court did not see a justification for
“stopping the clock,” Amendment 726 has no clock. Rather, it is
constructed with an overbroad presumption that every victim of financial
identity theft spends a significant amount of time seeking reimbursement.175
Had Amendment 726 governed the cases of the defendants at issue in
Yagar, Conner, Orr, Kennedy, and Pham, they would each have received
upward sentencing enhancements that counted, as “victims,” account
holders who were viewed by the sentencing court not to have suffered any
significant adverse effect as a result of their crimes. Such a result is not in
proportion to the harm suffered by those account holders and is contrary to
the intended goals of the Guidelines. As evidenced by the opinions of the
170. Stepanian, 570 F.3d at 56.
171. Id.
The declarations reveal[ed] that one victim [who] was traveling abroad could not pay
her travel expenses during the period of the theft. Another victim described how he and
his family had no money for food and gas for a period of time because of the theft, and
how their card was denied when they tried to use it to pay for their son’s birthday party.
Id.

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 55–56.
Stepanian, 570 F.3d at 56; see also Ter-Esayan, 570 F.3d at 51.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
See Public Hearings, supra note 20, at 37.
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Third, Second, and First Circuits—which found that account holders had
suffered harm as a result of time lost seeking reimbursement—it is Yagar’s
reasoning, not Lee’s or Amendment 726, that provides the proper rubric for
determining whether time lost seeking reimbursement should be a factor
that leads to an increase in a defendant’s recommended sentence.176
2. Constructional Errors
Amendment 726 contains two inherent constructional errors that are
inconsistent with the proper operation of Section 2B1.1. The first is that
Amendment 726 fails to address the “double-counting” that occurs when a
reimbursed account holder and the financial institution that reimburses it
are each included in the “victims” calculation—viz. the singular financial
loss is ascribed to two separate “victims” and, thus, is counted twice in the
“actual loss” calculation.177 This error is plain and has been adequately
addressed by previous scholarship,178 so it will not be further expounded by
this note.
The second error relates to the relationship between the calculation of
“actual loss” and “victims” under Section 2B1.1. For the purposes of
Section 2B1.1(b)(1), where there is no “actual loss” there can be no
“victim,” because under Section 2B1.1 calculation of “actual loss” and the
identification of “victims” are two distinct and interdependent concepts.179
If an individual has not suffered an “actual loss,” he is not a “victim,” and
must not be counted as such under 2B1.1(b)(2). Despite this, Lee reasoned
that, read in conjunction with the Credits Against Loss provision, the Actual
Loss provision inherently recognizes that all reimbursed account holders
suffer an initial loss, and should therefore be included in the “victims”
calculation.180 This reasoning—adopted by the First Circuit in Stepanian,
and implicitly adopted by Amendment 726—is, as articulated in Conner,
Orr, and Armstead, patently unsound because it allows inclusion of account
holders in the “victims” calculation without requiring that they be included
in the “actual loss” calculation.
This error was identified by the Ninth Circuit in Armstead, which held
that it is wrong to count individuals who were fully reimbursed as “victims”
“without regard to whether their losses were included in the loss
176. This Note advocates for an Amendment that adopts Yagar’s reasoning but employs a
departure application to account for the harm suffered by reimbursed account holders, rather than
automatically counting them as “victims.” See discussion Part V infra.
177. Amendment 726 automatically includes reimbursed account holders in the “victims”
calculation, regardless of whether or not they have suffered any harm, and thus is prone to doublecounting the reimbursed financial losses. E.g., Harrington, supra note 8, at 448; Parsons, supra
note 9, at 852.
178. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 8, at 450–51, 456–57.
179. E.g., United States v. Orr, 567 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Armstead,
552 F.3d 769, 783 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 489 (5th Cir. 2008).
180. See United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005).
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calculation.”181 The Armstead court stated that although “persons who are
reimbursed may suffer pecuniary harm,” the Lee court had conducted a
backwards calculation by identifying “victims” before calculating “loss.”182
Armstead held instead that “[a] court should analyze and quantify pecuniary
harm when making the loss calculation, not when determining the number
of victims.”183 Hence, “[o]nce a loss amount is included in the loss
calculation, then the person associated with that loss should also be
included in the victim calculation.”184
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits also recognized this error. In Conner, the
Firth Circuit rejected Lee’s reading of the Actual Loss Provision and denied
that it should be read in conjunction with the Credits Against Loss
provision, holding instead that individual account holders do not suffer
“pecuniary harm at the moment the purchases [are] charged to their
accounts. . . . [and] [i]t is a strained reading of [the Actual Loss provision]
to say that the account holders suffered ‘pecuniary harm that resulted from
the offense’” despite being fully reimbursed.185 The Conner court further
stated that Lee’s “interpretation of the definition of ‘actual loss’ is not
compatible with its plain meaning”186 because where account holders have
been made pecuniarily whole by their reimbursements, they have not
suffered an “actual loss.”187 Moreover, the Conner court found this
reasoning to be improper because courts:
should not look to a separate provision of the Application Notes to create
an ambiguity . . . [because] there is no indication that use of the word
“victim” [in the Credits Against Loss provision] was intended to modify
the definition of the term as used in § 2B1.1(b)(2). . . . [and,][f]inally, [the
Credits Against Loss provision] is about how to count “loss,” which is a
related but distinct concept from “actual loss”—how the Application
Notes instruct us to identity “victims.”188

In Orr, the Tenth Circuit also rejected Lee’s reading of the Credits
Against Loss provision in favor of Connor’s reading because “[the Credits
Against Loss provision], by its own express terms, ‘applies to the
determination of loss under subsection (b)(1),’” and calculating “loss” and
identifying “victims” are “distinct concepts” for the purposes of Section
2B1.1.189 Orr further rejected that there is a separate “initial loss” that can

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Armstead, 552 F.3d. at 782.
Id. at 783.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 490 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 491 n.38 (citation omitted).
United States v. Orr, 567 F.3d. 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3 (2010)).
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be considered as opposed to the “actual loss” if the victim has been fully
reimbursed.190
Connor, Orr, and Armstead demonstrate that, as in Lee, Amendment
726 will inherently violate the constructional design of the 2B1.1(b)(1)
“actual loss” calculations by mandating that all reimbursed account holders
be counted as “victims.” In addition, Amendment 726 fails to resolve
Section 2B1.1’s “double-counting” issue for financial identity theft crimes.
The solution proposed by this note will attempt to remedy these errors.
V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
As is made clear through the progression of the four-year circuit split,
while the Federal Sentencing Commission has achieved greater sentencing
consistency through adoption of Amendment 726, it has done so at the
expense of sentencing proportionality and the proper operation of the
2B1.1(b)(1) “actual loss” calculations, and has failed to remedy the risk of
double-counting financial losses incurred as a result of financial identity
theft. A superior resolution to the reimbursed victims issue is to implement:
(1) an amendment to Section 2B1.1 specifically excluding reimbursed
account holders from the definition of “victims” under 2B1.1 and
specifically stating that time lost seeking reimbursement is not a “pecuniary
harm”; and (2) a guided upward departure application modeled after the
Yagar line of reasoning that takes into account time lost seeking
reimbursement.
The guided departure application should be incorporated into
Application Note 19(A)(vi) of Section 2B1.1, which governs specific
upward departure considerations for cases “involving access devices or
unlawfully produced or unlawfully obtained means of identification.”191 It
should be a fourth factor that a court may consider in deciding whether to
apply an upward departure, and should read: “The offense caused a
reimbursed account holder to spend a significant amount of time or effort
seeking reimbursement for financial losses, or while repairing harm
suffered as a result of the unauthorized dissemination of their means of
identification.” This proposed departure application mirrors Yagar’s
qualifying explanation in recognizing that reimbursed account holders do
not necessarily suffer an “adverse effect” when their financial losses are
short-lived, and explicitly provides for the inclusion of time or effort lost
seeking reimbursement as harms that may be appropriately considered as
sentencing enhancement factors. Notably, the term “account holder” should
be used, as opposed to “victim,” because under this proposed amendment
reimbursed account holders are not to be counted as “victims” under
2B1.1(b)(2).
190. Id. at 616.
191. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.19(A)(vi) (2010).
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At the outset, it is important to note that departure applications are
designed to govern exceptional circumstances,192 and in the case of
financial identity theft crimes, the reimbursed victims issue is a nearly everpresent norm, hardly the exception. At first blush, therefore, implementing
a departure application to rectify the reimbursed victims issue might appear
inappropriate. However, the benefits of implementing this guided departure
application193—promoting sentencing proportionality for financial identity
theft crimes, ensuring the proper operation of 2B1.1 “victims” and “actual
loss” calculations, and remedying the risk of double-counting financial
losses—far outweigh this slight constructional anomaly.
This proposed solution will promote the Commission’s primary
motivation in amending the definition of “victim” in Section 2B1.1(b)(2) to
include individuals who have been fully reimbursed for their financial
identity theft losses. Namely, because “such an individual, even if fully
reimbursed, must often spend significant time resolving credit problems and
related issues, and such lost time may not be adequately accounted for in
the loss calculations under the guidelines.”194 The proposed solution is
necessary to attain this goal because Amendment 726 does not adequately
account for such lost time. Applied to either the case of an account holder
who is immediately reimbursed, or to one who spends a significant amount
of time seeking reimbursement, Amendment 726 produces inherently
erroneous outcomes. Under Amendment 726, the harm suffered by an
account holder who has lost large amounts of time seeking reimbursement
is equated to that of an account holder who was immediately reimbursed
and may not even have been aware of his financial loss.195 Thus,
Amendment 726 suffers from an inherent lack of proportionality—a critical
element of the Guidelines’ statutory intent—and the proposed amendments
will remedy this.
This proposal would also eliminate Amendment 726’s constructional
errors. The risk of double-counting financial losses is eliminated because
the proposed solution would mandate that reimbursed account holders not
be counted as “victims” at sentencing. Thus, the financial losses incurred
will only be ascribed to the entities that reimbursed the individual account
holders. The proposed amendments will also restore the proper operation of
the “actual loss” and “victims” calculations. Amendment 726 mandates that
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006) (allowing departures when the sentencing court “finds
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines
that should result in a sentence different from that described”).
193. Guided departures are designed to be employed more frequently than unguided departures.
See discussion supra Part I; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b) (2010).
194. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C, Amend. 726, at 310 (2010)
(emphasis added).
195. See id. (listing no distinction between account holders who suffered harm due to the use of
their means of identification and those who did not).
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an account holder whose means of identification is used unlawfully be
included in the 2B1.1(b)(2) “victims” calculation, but gives no guidance as
to how such lost time should be accounted for, if at all, in the 2B1.1(b)(1)
“actual loss” calculation. As articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Armstead,
“in order to be counted as a victim, a person must have sustained a loss that
is ‘monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable in money’ and that loss
must be included in the loss calculation.”196 Yet, Amendment 726
presupposes that every reimbursed account holder has incurred such losses
without providing a rubric for defining these losses in monetary terms. The
proposal outlined here eliminates this quandary entirely. Under the
proposed amendments, time lost seeking reimbursement need not be
quantified and included in the “actual loss” calculation because the
reimbursed account holders are not to be included in the “victims”
calculation; yet, if they have suffered an adverse effect through time lost
seeking reimbursement this harm will be reflected via the proposed
departure application.197
Roy Michael Anderson

196. United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 780–81 (9th Cir. 2008).
197. Cf. Parsons, supra note 9, at 864–68 (proposing a solution to the reimbursed victims issue
that includes time lost seeking reimbursement in the “actual loss” calculations based on the
proposition that—employing an “opportunity cost” theory—time lost seeking reimbursement is
readily measurable in money).
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